Elizabeth Murray , Professor Ph. Morelli , Professor Ph. Miami University Oxford, Ohio , Miami has a strong MA program that prepares undergraduates as well as post-undergraduate students for Ph. In that way it fills an important function that is fairly unique. Particularly strong in Feminist Philosophy.
Penn State is now significantly weaker than it used to be. The Faculty: Robert Bernasconi , Professor: continental philosophy, Hegel, race theory and social and political philosophy. Veronique Foti , Professor of Philosophy: continental philosophy, phenomenology, continental Rationalism, ancient philosophy, philosophy of art, philosophy and literary theory.
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale The department got stronger with the new hirings in continental philosophy. Anthony Steinbock , Professor, Contemporary French and German philosophy, phenomenology, social ontology and aesthetics. Kenneth Stikkers , Professor, Philosophy of economics, contemporary continental philosophy Scheler, Foucault. Stephen Tyman, Associate Professor, 18th and 19th Century. European philosophy, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, phenomenology and existentialism. Casey , Professor: Phenomenology, philosophical psychology, aesthetics, theory of psychoanalysis.
David B. Rawlinson , Associate Professor: 19th-century philosophy; philosophy of medicine, aesthetics and literary theory, Hegel, philosophical psychology. Hugh J.
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Boston University Boston University is also not predominantly continental. Tina Chanter , Ph. Bill Martin , Ph. William McNeill , Ph. Darrell Moore , Ph.
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Michael Naas , Ph. Kevin Thompson , Ph. Thomas R. Yet, the writing of the coherent narrative had a surprising effect. The surprising effect led to the other intention that animated Early Twentieth Century Continental Philosophy.
On the other hand this is the second intention , Early Twentieth Century Continental Philosophy aimed to assemble and systematize basic features from the ideas these specific philosophers and thinkers had developed. These features, I argue, open up a philosophical research agenda, a philosophical task or project, for those of us who are still working in the wake of early twentieth century continental philosophy. Now, as I wrote the narrative of early twentieth century continental philosophy, I discovered four fundamental features of this thinking.
You can see that with the first and the fourth features immanence and the overcoming of metaphysics , the philosophical research agenda that I tried to open up is based in the Nietzschean idea of the reversal of Platonism. To reverse Platonism means that we value this world in itself, immanently, and no longer value it in relation to transcendent forms such as the Platonic idea of the good. More precisely, we must say that the reversal of Platonism means that the duration of existence has no beginning and it has no end.
It has no primary origin and no ultimate destination. In the reversal, the time of duration becomes unlimited. While we start out from a well-known definition of the reversal of Platonism, we have end up in a complicated idea. The reversal of Platonism leads us to the idea of time imagined as a line that has no terminal points, a line that never bends itself back into a circle. It leads us to imagine time as an unlimited straight line. It seems to me that, despite all the philosophical reflections on time that have taken place across the 20th century, the implications of the idea of unlimited time which is immanence itself remain, at the least, under-determined, and, more likely, I think, the implications remain largely unknown.
The philosophical research agenda that I opened up in Early Twentieth Century Continental Philosophy therefore concerns first and foremost the determination of the implications of immanence. I am not sure that I have determined and I am not sure that one is in fact able to determine all the implications of immanence.
I am not even sure we are able to understand all the consequences of the implications that we are able to determine. Nevertheless, the set of implications that I think we can determine leads to a problem. In fact, it is this problem that really animated me while writing Early Twentieth Century Continental Philosophy. Immanence implies that the reversal of Platonism does not merely concern an abstract problem in the history of philosophy. The worst is a reaction to fundamental violence, a reaction that tends toward complete suicide. However, as we shall see, the reaction of the worst violence does not really reach the most fundamental level.
At the most fundamental level, we discover that we really do not know the answer to the question of what happened no principal origin and we do not know the answer to the question of what is going to happen no ultimate purpose. In this more fundamental experience of absolute non-knowledge, the pain of this violence is most acute. And, insofar as we cannot really stop the violence, the experience of pain really amounts to us feeling shame, shame that we cannot stop ourselves from collaborating in the violence and shame in the face of those others who suffer that violence.
It is this feeling of shame that motivates us not to react with the worst violence against the violence that cannot be reduced. Instead, shame motivates us to let that fundamental violence be. At bottom, after all, life is violence, and letting life be life is less bad than suicide. Letting life be life is less bad than no life at all. So, the philosophical research agenda that Early Twentieth Century Continental Philosophy opens up really concerns the search for a solution to this problem of the worst violence, a solution I just outlined and to which I shall return in a few moments in this first part of my response to my two reviewers.
In fact, most of what I will speak about in this first part will concern the solution to the problem of the worst. But first, we must examine immanence more precisely. The Implications of Immanence In order to truly understand the implications of immanence, we would have to engage in the phenomenological reduction.
Being at this ultra-transcendental level, temporalization is the absolute. Temporalization is a structure consisting of two contradictory forces: singularization and universalization. On the one hand, singularization forces a present moment, like the sharp point of sword, to insert itself into the flow of time.
On the other hand, however, universalization forces the flow of time, like a charging army, to overrun the singularity of the moment. Time temporalizes or endures by means of the force of universalization and the force of singularization, the force of repetition and the force of event. These two elements of repetition or universalization and event or singularization are irreducibly connected to one another but without unification.
20th Century Continental Philosophy
In other words, these two forces are necessarily bound to one another and necessarily dis-unified or non-coincidental, cracked apart like a wound and yet linked together like a suture. The necessity of these two forces is so strong that we are powerless not to obey their commands, even though their commands cannot be reconciled. Indeed, the experience we are describing is the experience of undecidability. How can we decide — and yet we must decide — when there is no choice but to singularize and to universalize?
We must singularize and at the same time we must universalize. The fundamental struggle of the two forces internal to all experience amounts to an irremediable injustice or an irreducible violence, right in me. In order to understand these implications more precisely and in order to understand the structure of temporalization that produces them, we would need to do more phenomenological work.
If we did that phenomenological work, we would see many more implications of immanence unfold.
Perspectives in Continental Philosophy - Fordham University Press
We do not have the time today to do that work although I have done some of that work and have catalogued several implications of immanence. The Event of Shame Although we have not been able to go through the method of the reduction which, in Husserl himself, is supposed to be a transformative experience , we must imagine that as we have been trying to determine the implications of immanence, we have become more and more aware of the war going on inside oneself.
How could one not feel responsible for the suffering? Therefore, we must speak of fundamental shame. And with fundamental shame, we must no longer speak of experience in general, but of an experience or even the experience. When the feeling of shame comes upon one at the fundamental level, it is the experience of the event. The key to what I am calling fundamental shame lies in the undecidability of the two forces at war in temporalization.
One is forced or even coerced to decide, but the undecidability -- that is, that there are poles between which one must decide -- makes the decision free.